Commentary. At Archange Shadows, we believe the European Union is right to raise its climate ambition—and wrong to imagine that legislation alone will make the transition politically durable.
In April, the EU made a 90% reduction in net greenhouse-gas emissions by 2040, compared with 1990 levels, legally binding. The framework allows up to 5% of the target to be met through high-quality international credits, a concession intended to provide flexibility without abandoning the central goal. The European Commission describes the measure as part of a broader effort involving emissions-trading reform, industrial support and national social-climate plans.
That is a consequential decision. It gives investors a clearer long-term signal, rewards companies that move early and keeps Europe aligned with the science of deep decarbonisation. It also prevents a familiar political failure: announcing distant aspirations while leaving each government free to postpone the difficult decisions.
But the target is not the policy. The policy is whether people can afford warmer homes, cleaner transport and reliable electricity while factories remain competitive. On that question, the EU’s record is less reassuring. The OECD’s 2026 Climate Action Monitor says climate policies have continued to expand, but progress has slowed, implementation remains uncertain and countries differ sharply in the strength of their policy mixes.
The case for pressing ahead
The strongest argument for the EU’s approach is that delay is not neutral. Every year of continued fossil-fuel dependence locks in infrastructure, exposes consumers to volatile imported energy and makes later reductions more abrupt. A binding target can coordinate national action, guide grid investment and make public support more predictable for clean-energy manufacturers.
There is also a geopolitical argument. Europe cannot claim strategic autonomy while remaining dependent on external suppliers for fuel and vulnerable to energy shocks. Electrification, efficiency and domestic renewable generation will not eliminate risk, but they can reduce it. The transition is therefore not merely an environmental project; it is an industrial and security strategy.
The objections are real
Critics are not necessarily climate sceptics when they warn that the timetable could damage living standards or send production abroad. Energy-intensive industries face competitors operating under weaker rules. Smaller firms may lack the capital to replace equipment. Lower-income households can be hit hardest by higher transport, heating or renovation costs, even when the eventual savings are substantial.
Those concerns deserve more than rhetorical reassurance. A target that produces factory closures, regional unemployment or a backlash against climate policy could prove less durable than a slightly slower plan with visible compensation. International credits also raise a legitimate question: if they become an escape valve rather than a supplement, Europe may claim reductions without making enough changes at home.
Supporters of a slower approach often argue that innovation will reduce costs if governments avoid excessive mandates. That argument has merit where regulation is poorly designed. Yet waiting for an unspecified technological breakthrough is not a strategy. It transfers costs to the future and leaves businesses uncertain about which investments will survive.
What credibility requires
Our view is that the EU should keep the 90% target but judge every measure against three tests: does it cut emissions in reality, does it protect vulnerable households and does it preserve a productive industrial base?
- Climate funding should reach households before new costs arrive, with simple grants and targeted bill relief rather than complex schemes that favour those with time and cash.
- Industrial policy should reward measurable emissions cuts while making support conditional on investment, training and regional employment.
- Governments should publish annual delivery milestones for grids, housing, transport and clean power, allowing voters to see whether promises are becoming infrastructure.
- International credits should remain tightly limited, independently verified and clearly additional to domestic reductions.
The political temptation will be to present opponents as either reckless obstructionists or enemies of the planet. That is a dead end. Europe needs an argument that recognises both the cost of climate change and the cost of transition—and then shows who pays, when and why.
The 2040 target is defensible. What is not defensible is asking citizens to trust a number without a credible route to reach it. Europe’s climate leadership will be measured less by the ambition of its law than by whether ordinary people can believe the transition belongs to them.
Sources
European Commission climate policy communication; EU Climate Action Progress Report 2026; OECD Climate Action Monitor 2026.