The death of nuclear has been greatly exaggerated
For more than a decade, Europe has been writing the obituary of nuclear power while promising a seamless leap into a wind-and-solar future. Yet as climate deadlines harden, grids strain, and geopolitics turns ugly, nuclear is not going quietly. It is being quietly extended, cautiously revived, and strategically rebranded — not as a rival to renewables, but as their indispensable, if imperfect, partner.
Spain’s decision to extend the life of the Almaraz nuclear plant to June 2030 is a case in point.[13] The Ministry for Ecological Transition renewed the operating authorization for Units I and II, and the order was published in the official state bulletin (BOE) on Friday, 15 August 2026.[7][13] Madrid insists this does not alter the broader nuclear phase-out timetable that runs through 2035.[13] On paper, nothing has changed. Politically and strategically, everything has.
The extension has reopened a bitter question: can Europe phase out nuclear and fossil fuels while keeping the lights on, bills down, and emissions falling fast enough — all at the same time? Spain, France, and Brussels are now edging toward the same uncomfortable answer: not without nuclear in the mix.
Spain’s uneasy compromise: extend reactors, promise their demise
Almaraz is more than a plant; it is a test of credibility. The two reactors can now operate at least until 8 June 2030, aligning them with the expected closure dates for Ascó I and Cofrentes, both also slated to disconnect in 2030.[7][13] Critics argue the extension risks morphing from a one-off exception into a rolling delay of Spain’s nuclear exit, especially if renewables deployment falters.
Supporters counter that the numbers tell a different story. In the first half of 2026, Spain’s big three utilities — Iberdrola, Endesa, and Naturgy — generated 24,809 GWh of nuclear power.[11] Yet nuclear’s share of their output has fallen to 31.7% in 2026, down from 36.7% in 2023, even as the plants keep running.[11] Over the same period, their installed renewable capacity surged 36.7%, from 29,715 MW in 2021 to 40,600 MW in 2026.[11]
These figures undermine the reflexive claim that keeping nuclear online automatically “crowds out” renewables. In Spain, renewables are climbing precisely while nuclear remains significant. The question is less whether nuclear blocks solar and wind, and more whether the grid, regulators, and investors can handle doing everything at once: build massive new renewable capacity, expand storage and networks — and avoid creating a supply gap by shutting firm low-carbon power too quickly.
Brussels bets on small reactors and big money
If Spain is improvising, Brussels is trying to turn improvisation into strategy. In March 2026, the European Commission pushed a more assertive nuclear revival package, including a plan to bring the first small modular reactors (SMRs) online at the start of the 2030s.[3][6] Since March, the EU has committed €330 million to nuclear and fusion research.[3][6] On 10 March 2026, it added a €200 million financing guarantee for nuclear energy, designed to reduce investment risk in low‑carbon nuclear technologies.[18][20]
This is not a nostalgic return to the grand Gigawatt Age of the 1970s. Instead, Brussels is treating SMRs as a strategic industrial project — a technology where Europe wants to compete with the United States, China, and others rather than simply source reactors from abroad.[10] A broader clean‑energy investment plan points to more than €75 billion in financing over the next three years to accelerate both renewables and new nuclear plants.[6]
At the same time, the Commission is blunt about nuclear’s continuing weight in Europe’s power system. Euronews reports that the EU expects nuclear to generate 24% of electricity in 2026, a share that makes it impossible to treat nuclear as a marginal technology.[5] Europe is not building from zero; it is managing the decline, renewal, or replacement of a vast, aging fleet while trying to hit climate targets.
France’s nuclear renaissance — with a renewable twist
If Brussels is hedging, France is doubling down. On 10 February 2026, Paris unveiled a major nuclear‑plus‑renewables strategy that aims to raise nuclear to 60% of electricity consumption in 2030.[9] The roadmap includes six new EPR reactors, with an option for eight more, enshrining nuclear as the backbone of French power well into mid‑century.[9]
France’s Prime Minister, Sébastien Lecornu, signalled that the long‑delayed energy roadmap was finally moving from rhetoric to law, saying the decree would be signed “at the end of next week” from the date of the report, meaning early 2026.[9] This is not merely a technical plan; it is an admission that France’s earlier flirtations with cutting nuclear back to 50% were incompatible with electrification, industrial policy, and the need for dependable low‑carbon baseload.
Yet note the framing: this is not a “nuclear versus renewables” platform. It is nuclear and renewables — a recognition that decarbonisation at the pace demanded by the 2030s requires every low‑carbon technology available, backed by heavy public and private finance.
The end of purity politics
From Madrid to Paris to Brussels, the energy debate is quietly abandoning purity politics. For years, Europe’s narrative favoured a clean break: shut nuclear, shun new reactors, and let renewables carry the future. Now, policymakers are confronting a harsher arithmetic. Electrifying transport, heating, and industry while retiring coal and gas plants cannot be done with variable renewables alone, at least not yet, not at the required speed, and not without massive new infrastructure.
So Spain extends Almaraz while insisting its phase‑out is intact.[13] The EU pours hundreds of millions into nuclear and fusion research while promoting a huge renewables build‑out.[3][6] France leans harder into reactors precisely as it talks up solar and wind.[9]
Energy systems are not ideologies; they are machines, grids, and balance sheets. Europe’s emerging consensus — messy, contested, and politically awkward — is that the transition will be nuclear‑assisted, or it will be slower, riskier, and more expensive. The real debate now is not whether nuclear has a role, but who controls it, who pays for it, and how long the reactors — old or new — will define Europe’s power in every sense of the word.