The global economy has entered a phase of resilience without security. Growth has held up better than many forecasters expected despite the conflict in the Middle East, persistent trade tensions and renewed energy-market disruption. Yet the headline stability conceals a widening divide: economies linked to artificial-intelligence investment and technology exports are receiving a powerful demand boost, while import-dependent countries face higher costs and weaker household purchasing power.
The International Monetary Fund projects global growth of 3.1% in 2026 and 3.4% in 2027. It also expects headline inflation to rise to 4.7% this year before easing to 4.1% next year. The OECD is less optimistic, forecasting growth of 2.9% in 2026 and 3.0% in 2027.
Why the shock has not become a global slump
Several buffers have softened the impact of the Middle East conflict. The OECD points to sizeable oil inventories, additional supply from outside Gulf economies and government support measures. Those cushions have prevented an immediate repeat of the most disruptive energy shocks, even as markets remain vulnerable to escalation.
A second buffer is the technology cycle. The IMF says strong investment in artificial intelligence has supported demand, production and trade. Semiconductor manufacturing, data-centre construction and related infrastructure have helped sustain activity, particularly in the United States and Asian exporting economies. The result is an unusual combination: geopolitical instability is restraining growth, while a concentrated investment boom is pulling in the opposite direction.
“The global economy is again proving resilient, but unevenly so and with rapidly narrowing margins of adjustment in the near term,” the IMF says in its October outlook.
That distinction matters. Aggregate growth can remain positive even when households and businesses in less-protected economies feel poorer. Higher energy and fertiliser prices raise transport and food costs, while higher interest rates make it harder for governments and companies to absorb the shock.
The AI cushion—and its limits
Optimists see AI investment as more than a temporary stimulus. Faster adoption could raise productivity, improve business efficiency and eventually lift wages and living standards. The OECD says stronger AI adoption could increase productivity and growth, while the IMF identifies faster productivity gains as an upside risk.
But the benefits are neither automatic nor evenly distributed. Much of the spending is concentrated among large technology firms and in a small number of countries with advanced capital markets, semiconductor capacity or abundant energy. If expected productivity gains fail to appear, today’s investment boom could become tomorrow’s correction. The IMF lists a reassessment of AI expectations among the principal downside risks.
That risk is amplified by the scale of the capital required. Data centres consume substantial electricity and depend on complex global supply chains. Their expansion can raise demand for power, chips and specialised equipment even as governments are trying to contain energy prices and strengthen supply security. AI may therefore relieve one constraint—weak investment—while intensifying others.
Inflation is returning as a policy problem
The immediate policy challenge is that weaker growth and higher prices are arriving together. Energy and fertiliser costs can lift inflation while reducing real incomes, forcing central banks to choose between supporting demand and preventing a second wave of price pressures.
The OECD expects inflationary pressure to moderate in 2027 if energy prices ease and monetary policy remains restrictive. That forecast depends partly on an assumed recovery in energy supply. A wider conflict, disrupted shipping or a sustained rise in oil prices would challenge the assumption and could leave central banks with less room to cut rates.
Governments face a similar trade-off. Targeted support can protect vulnerable households and firms, but broad subsidies may worsen fiscal pressures and prolong demand-driven inflation. The IMF also identifies fiscal vulnerabilities as a major risk, particularly for countries already carrying high debt-service costs.
What comes next
The next year will be shaped by three interacting tests. First, can energy markets remain supplied despite geopolitical escalation? Second, will AI investment translate into measurable productivity rather than inflated expectations? Third, can trade relationships become more predictable after years of tariffs and supply-chain restructuring?
The optimistic scenario is a gradual easing of energy prices, continued AI investment and stronger productivity growth. In that case, global expansion could accelerate in 2027, as both the IMF and OECD anticipate. The darker scenario combines renewed conflict, persistent energy inflation and a sharp repricing of technology assets. That would expose the uneven foundations beneath the current resilience.
The central lesson is that resilience is not the same as stability. The global economy is absorbing extraordinary shocks, but it is doing so through narrow supports: inventories, public intervention and concentrated technology spending. Policymakers may still avoid a worldwide downturn, yet the distribution of costs and benefits will increasingly determine whether that success is felt beyond markets and headline GDP figures.