The global economy has entered an awkward phase: growth remains resilient, yet the conditions supporting it are becoming more fragile. Artificial-intelligence investment is sustaining production, trade and corporate spending, while renewed energy pressures, higher long-term borrowing costs and geopolitical conflict are narrowing policymakers’ room for manoeuvre.
The central tension is visible in the latest forecasts. The OECD projects global gross domestic product will grow 2.9% in 2026 and 3% in 2027, while the European Commission expects growth outside the European Union to reach 3.2% this year and 3.6% in 2027 and 2028. Those figures do not describe a recessionary world. They do, however, point to an economy increasingly dependent on a small number of powerful engines—especially US technology investment and Asian trade.
AI is both stimulus and vulnerability
Large technology companies are continuing to expand spending on data centres, chips, software and electricity infrastructure. The European Commission says AI-related investment in the United States continued to grow vigorously in 2026, while the OECD identifies technology activity as a major support for investment, production and trade.
This boom has benefits beyond the technology sector. Construction, utilities, semiconductor manufacturing and business services all gain from the expansion of computing capacity. Strong demand for advanced equipment has also helped sustain merchandise trade, which rose 6% year-on-year in the first eight months of 2026, according to the European Commission.
But the scale of the investment creates a second risk. AI infrastructure requires enormous upfront financing, and the OECD reports that long-term interest rates in many economies have reached their highest levels in 15 years or more. The institution also points to heavy bond issuance by AI companies as part of the pressure on markets.
“Global economic prospects remain heavily dependent on whether a durable resolution to the Middle East conflict is achieved,” the OECD said in its interim outlook.
That dependence matters because enthusiasm for AI has encouraged companies and investors to tolerate high valuations and large capital commitments. If expected productivity gains arrive quickly, the spending could become the foundation of a durable expansion. If revenues disappoint or financing costs remain elevated, the same investment wave could expose highly leveraged firms and weaken business confidence.
Energy shocks complicate the picture
The economy’s other central pressure comes from energy. The OECD says oil prices have risen again amid disruptions to production and exports in Gulf economies, while refining bottlenecks are adding to consumer and business costs. Agricultural commodities have also become more expensive, partly because extreme weather has damaged supply.
Governments have some protection against an immediate shock. Oil inventories remain sizeable, alternative supply has increased and public support measures have cushioned households and firms, according to the OECD. Those buffers help explain why global activity has not fallen sharply.
They are not cost-free. Fiscal support can increase public borrowing, while prolonged subsidies may reduce incentives to conserve energy or invest in alternatives. Central banks face a difficult trade-off: raising interest rates can restrain inflation but weaken investment and household demand; keeping policy looser can support growth while allowing price pressures to persist.
Why the outlook differs across regions
The apparent resilience of the world economy masks uneven exposure. The United States benefits from the concentration of AI investment and strong corporate spending. Asian economies are leading merchandise-trade growth, according to the European Commission. Emerging markets are expected to provide much of the global growth acceleration in 2027, but many remain vulnerable to energy prices, currency movements and higher global borrowing costs.
Europe faces a more complicated combination of weak underlying momentum, energy sensitivity and competition in strategic industries. European technology executives have called for measures to mobilise household savings for investment, arguing that the region has capital but lacks mechanisms to channel it efficiently into innovation. Critics of that approach warn that directing savings toward high-growth sectors cannot substitute for stronger productivity, predictable regulation and affordable energy.
Across economies, the distributional effects are equally important. Shareholders, technology suppliers and workers in expanding industries may benefit from the AI boom, while households facing higher food, transport and housing costs may experience little improvement in living standards. The OECD warns that stronger price pressures, weaker real-income growth and higher interest rates will moderate near-term momentum.
What comes next
The next phase will depend on whether AI investment produces measurable productivity gains before financing and energy costs undermine it. A durable expansion would require companies to turn infrastructure spending into broad efficiency improvements rather than simply larger computing bills.
Policymakers will also need to manage the interaction between climate shocks, energy security and inflation. That means protecting vulnerable households without locking in inefficient subsidies, expanding electricity and grid capacity, and maintaining credible fiscal plans as debt-service costs rise.
The most likely outcome is neither an immediate collapse nor a frictionless boom. Growth can continue, but it will be more sensitive to a handful of risks: a wider Middle East conflict, a sharper energy disruption, a correction in AI-related assets or a renewed rise in bond yields. The economy’s resilience is real. So is its dependence on conditions that policymakers cannot fully control.
