The global economy has entered a difficult balancing act: an energy shock severe enough to lift inflation, yet not—so far—powerful enough to stop growth. The disruption to energy infrastructure and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, the main artery for global oil trade, has forced governments and central banks to confront a familiar dilemma: contain prices without causing a broader downturn.
The European Commission’s autumn forecast says energy flows remain severely disrupted nearly eight months after the conflict began and that supply will recover only gradually, even if the strait fully reopens. Its central scenario still sees global growth outside the European Union reaching 3.2% in 2026 and 3.6% in 2027 and 2028. The OECD is more cautious, projecting worldwide growth of 2.9% this year and 3% next year. The difference reflects uncertainty over how long the energy shock lasts and how quickly higher prices feed into wages, consumption and investment.
Why the shock has not become a collapse
Several buffers have absorbed the initial blow. The OECD points to sizeable oil inventories, additional supply from outside Gulf economies and government support measures. Those cushions have allowed households and companies to adjust more gradually than they did during earlier supply crises.
Trade has also remained unexpectedly resilient. Merchandise trade rose 6% year on year during the first eight months of 2026, according to the European Commission, led by advanced and emerging Asian economies. That performance suggests that firms have rerouted supplies and built more flexibility into logistics, even as energy and insurance costs rise.
A second support is the investment boom tied to artificial intelligence. Large technology companies continue to expand spending on data centres, chips and related infrastructure, particularly in the United States. The OECD says AI-related activity has supported investment, production and trade, helping offset weakness elsewhere.
That resilience, however, is uneven. Energy-intensive manufacturers, transport operators and lower-income households face a more immediate squeeze than technology companies with strong cash flows. In Europe, where industrial competitiveness was already under pressure, higher refining margins and fuel costs could further weaken production.
The inflation problem is returning
The immediate policy risk is that a temporary energy shock becomes persistent inflation. Higher fuel and electricity costs raise transport and production expenses; businesses then decide whether to absorb those costs, reduce output or pass them to consumers. If workers seek compensation for lost purchasing power, the shock can broaden beyond energy.
Central banks are therefore moving back toward tighter policy, according to the European Commission. The OECD likewise warns that stronger price pressures, weaker real-income growth and higher interest rates will moderate momentum. Higher borrowing costs are especially significant for governments carrying large debts, as well as for households refinancing mortgages and companies funding new projects.
There is a counterargument. S&P Global’s November outlook says a sharp fall in crude prices could ease near-term inflation, even as monetary tightening continues. If supply routes stabilize and inventories remain adequate, the current episode may resemble a painful price spike rather than a lasting inflation cycle. But that outcome depends on assumptions about security and energy markets that governments cannot fully control.
What the conflict changes
The shock is also accelerating a strategic shift in energy policy. Importers have stronger incentives to diversify suppliers, expand storage and invest in alternatives. Exporters outside the Gulf may gain market share, while Asian economies—already driving much of the trade expansion—could become more important hubs for refining, manufacturing and clean-energy supply chains.
Yet diversification is costly and slow. New pipelines, terminals, power grids and renewable capacity require years of investment. In the interim, governments may rely on subsidies or price controls, protecting consumers but increasing fiscal pressure. The OECD warns that elevated refining margins and production bottlenecks are already pushing up business costs.
AI investment adds another complication. It is supporting growth, but it also concentrates capital and electricity demand in a small number of firms and regions. If markets begin to question the profitability of the buildout, a pullback could remove one of the economy’s strongest current supports. The resilience story would then look less like a broad recovery and more like dependence on a narrow technology cycle.
What comes next
The next phase will be determined by three variables: the duration of the disruption, the path of crude prices and the response of central banks. A rapid reopening of the Strait of Hormuz could ease inflation and give policymakers room to pause. Prolonged disruption would raise the likelihood of additional rate increases, weaker real incomes and sharper stress in energy-importing economies.
The most plausible near-term outlook is neither global collapse nor a return to normality. Growth is holding because inventories, trade adaptation and AI spending are buying time. But those buffers cannot substitute indefinitely for stable energy flows. The central question is whether policymakers use that time to diversify supply and protect vulnerable households—or merely postpone the economic costs until the next shock.
Sources: European Commission autumn 2026 economic forecast; OECD Economic Outlook, September 2026; S&P Global November 2026 outlook.
