Europe’s economic strength has long rested on one assumption: that trade can be governed by rules, not raw power. That assumption is now under strain. EU institutions are watching the Union’s weight in global trade, but the bigger issue is whether that weight still translates into leverage in a world shaped by strategic rivalry.
China remains central to the problem. The EU keeps trying to manage a relationship that is simultaneously commercial, competitive and political. Brussels wants access to Chinese markets and inputs, but it also wants to reduce vulnerability, protect technology and avoid being dragged into a dependency that narrows its foreign-policy room.
The transatlantic relationship is another source of uncertainty. European officials know that cooperation with Washington remains essential, but they are also operating in an era where US policy can change quickly and security priorities can shift away from Europe. That makes trade policy part of a much wider strategic calculation, not just a tariff negotiation.
This has practical consequences inside the Union. Companies want predictability, governments want resilience and institutions want autonomy, but those goals often point in different directions. More screening, more industrial policy and more de-risking may help Europe absorb shocks, but they also carry costs and can slow growth.
The broader story is that Europe is being forced to choose between a comfortable dependence on the global system and a more expensive form of strategic self-protection. In 2026, it is trying to have both. That is increasingly the hardest position to defend.
