The diplomatic calendar looks promising on paper. A U.S.-China summit aimed at reducing trade tensions. The Shangri La dialogue later this month bringing Indo-Pacific leaders together. Yet beneath the surface, Asian governments are experiencing a different kind of anxiety than the Cold War choice between superpowers. They fear a world where Washington and Beijing cut deals directly, leaving everyone else scrambling for scraps.
The fear is not abstract. The White House is touting a 'Board of Trade' as a major summit deliverable—a bilateral commerce framework focused narrowly on U.S.-China transactions. Conspicuously absent: mechanisms to address China's predatory trade practices that threaten to stunt industrial development in Indonesia, the Philippines, and across Southeast Asia. These economies lack the political clout to push back unilaterally, yet they're not invited to negotiate the rules.
Indonesia and the Philippines face a particular squeeze. They've successfully attracted manufacturing investment as tariff-weary companies seek alternatives to China, positioning themselves as the winners of 2025's trade realignment. But a U.S.-China rapprochement could reverse that advantage overnight. If Washington lifts tariffs on Beijing in exchange for rare-earth mineral concessions or technology agreements, the rationale for reshoring to Southeast Asia evaporates. Millions of jobs tied to the region's manufacturing boom hang in the balance.
Curt Campbell's assessment in Foreign Affairs frames the summit as 'the first real test of Trump's true alignment' in a divided Asia. Regional analysts are watching for signals: Will Trump trade security commitments—alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia—for favorable economic terms with Beijing? South Korea and Japan have already begun deepening ties to hedge against such a scenario, setting aside historical disputes to coordinate on supply chains and economic security. But smaller nations have fewer options. The Shangri La dialogue will be their chance to remind Washington that a sustainable Indo-Pacific order requires more than superpower consensus.
