The European Union likes to describe itself as a rules-based power. In practice, it is discovering how expensive that formula has become. The bloc can sanction, subsidize and standardize with remarkable efficiency; it still struggles to project military force, move quickly in crises, or speak with one voice when security turns urgent.
That weakness is no longer abstract. Russia’s war against Ukraine has pushed European leaders toward rearmament, procurement coordination and greater defense-industrial cooperation, but the pace remains uneven. Germany, France and the smaller states still disagree on how far Europe should go in building a truly autonomous security posture, and whether that means complementing NATO or preparing for a world in which Washington is less dependable.
The result is a familiar European compromise: more ambition than before, but not yet enough to match the threat. Brussels has become more comfortable talking about strategic autonomy, joint borrowing and industrial policy. Yet when the question turns to hard power — troops, air defense, ammunition, command structures — the union remains a patchwork of national decisions disguised as common strategy.
That gap matters because geopolitics has become the dominant organizing principle of European policy. Energy, trade, technology and migration are now treated less as separate dossiers than as instruments of national resilience. The EU can still shape global standards and market access. What it has not yet solved is how to convert economic scale into deterrence.
Europe’s real challenge is not whether it can afford to become more geopolitical. It is whether it can afford not to be.
