Europe is no longer debating whether geopolitics has returned; it is debating how much of the old European model can survive it. Russia’s war in Ukraine, pressure on NATO, trade frictions with the United States and a more confrontational China have pushed the EU into a world where security, industrial policy and diplomacy are increasingly fused.
That shift is visible in Brussels. The Commission is leaning harder into defence-related lending, critical infrastructure protection and strategic investment screening, while member states demand faster decisions and fewer legal hesitations. The language of efficiency and resilience is replacing the old European reflex of assuming that markets, treaties and multilateralism would do the heavy lifting.
But a more militarised Europe raises a hard political question: can the EU strengthen its hard power without hollowing out its own liberal identity? A union built on law, trade and institutional restraint now talks openly about economic statecraft, supply-chain control and security-first policy. That may be necessary, but it also risks making Europe look more like the bloc it has long tried not to become.
The deeper problem is cohesion. Some capitals want a tougher, more sovereign Europe; others fear that strategic autonomy becomes a license for protectionism or an excuse for richer states to dominate the agenda. The result is a familiar European compromise under strain: consensus on the threat, disagreement on the response.
If Europe succeeds, it could emerge with a sharper institutional core, a stronger defence posture and a more credible place in a fragmented world. If it fails, the EU could find itself with bigger ambitions, higher defence bills and the same old habit of moving too slowly for the era it now inhabits.
